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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine how different variables can affect a 
terrorist group’s reaction to a targeted leadership strike, known as a decapitation 
strike. Decapitation strikes often produce unwanted results, such as a splintering of 
the terrorist group, or a failure to destroy the group. It is important that we 
understand which variables can lead to a group’s destruction after a decapitation 
strike, to maximize the decapitation’s effectiveness. In my research I have 
determined that group size, group ideological extremism, and the role of the leader 
targeted all have a substantial impact on the success of the decapitation strike. 
Using these three variables, I will examine three groups which have varying size, 
extremism, and leadership, and determine whether the decapitation strikes were 
successful and how these variables affected the results.  
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Introduction 
 
Terrorism has been an issue that states have had to deal with for a very long time, and 
different tactics have been used to combat this global threat. Terrorist groups like Boko Haram 
and ISIS have killed many people and proven resilient to the range of tactics countries use 
including mass arrests, military raids, and precision strikes. One of the most widely-used 
strategies for dealing with terrorist groups is known as “decapitation,” and it involves the 
removal of terrorist leadership via arrest or targeted killing1. This tactic, despite its popularity, 
has not always produced desirable results, often leading to terrorist groups being unaffected or 
splintering into potentially more dangerous groups. This is a great concern for any nation 
attempting to fight terrorism, and therefore it is important for nations to know the circumstances 
in which this tactic is most effective.  
In this paper I will attempt to discover the variables that lead to a terrorist group dissolving 
or splintering after the killing or capture of a leader. In this paper, I propose that the variables 
that will most affect how a terrorist group is affected by decapitation are: the group’s size, how 
ideologically extreme the group is, and the role of the targeted leader. I will analyze several 
different groups that were subjected to this tactic and identify which variables affected the 
group’s reaction to a decapitation strike. My findings will show that each group’s unique 
characteristics affect their reaction to decapitation strikes, and thus governments must explore 
these characteristics before committing to a strategy of decapitation.  
                                                            
1 Manes, Aaron, 2008, Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing Its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Groups 
Activity?, page 40. 
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Decapitation research 
 
Price (2012) argues that decapitation tactics “significantly increases the mortality rate of 
terrorist groups,”2 using the duration of the group post-decapitation as his metric of 
effectiveness. He claims that terrorist group’s “unique organizational characteristics” increase 
the importance of the leaders and thus creates instability inside the group when those leaders are 
killed3. Price argues that violent groups have increased group cohesion and are led by 
charismatic leaders which make finding replacements harder than in non-violent groups4. These 
two factors make leadership transitions difficult.  
With those parameters in mind, Price makes the argument that decapitation of terrorist 
groups is effective because of their violent, clandestine, and value-based organization5. He also 
shows that the earlier a group is decapitated, the shorter the time until the group disappears. 
While factual, his findings do not answer my question of whether decapitation strategies 
effectively combat terrorist groups and reduce their ability to carry out strikes. While it is 
apparent that groups tend to disappear after some decapitation strikes, Price deliberately doesn’t 
consider if terrorist violence is reduced. This is an important factor in determining if a group 
splintered, and therefore his findings are limited.  
                                                            
2 Bryan C., Price, 2012, Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism, Page 11. 
3 Price, 2012, page 11. 
4 Price, 2012, page 17. 
5 Price, 2012, page 43. 
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 Jenna Jordan (2014) argues that some groups can continue to operate and carry out 
attacks after a decapitation strike because of two variables: bureaucracy and popular support6. 
She argues that groups which are highly bureaucratized and have large popular support can 
survive these attacks because the leadership is less important. Moreover, larger and older, and 
thus more bureaucratized, groups, as well as religious ones, which often enjoy public support, are 
the most resilient to decapitation strikes7.  
 Aaron Mannes (2008) attempts to find out if “decapitation strategies have a statistically 
significant effect on the targeted organization’s terrorist activity8.” Mannes admits that 24,000 
out of the 34,000 cases of terrorism in his data base are attributed to “unknown actors, which 
might make it difficult to prove his theory. This was one of the main reasons why Price decided 
to instead narrow his research to group longevity instead of activity. Mannes also divided the 
groups into “group type,” which included nationalist/separatist, religious, communist/socialist. 
Mannes found that decapitation strikes and strikes that are followed by “crackdowns” reduce the 
incidents of attacks by these groups, and for smaller groups it can lead to complete destruction of 
the organization9. While Mannes’ findings shed light on whether these strategies are statistically 
useful, his lack of variables aside from the type of organization fail to answer the question of 
why some groups of the same “type” are affected differently by decapitation strategies.  
 In her other work, Jenna Jordan (2008) uses social network analysis10 to determine the 
type of structure that groups have and how this relates to the effectiveness of decapitation strikes, 
                                                            
6 Jordan, Jenna, 2014, Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes, page 11. 
7 Jordan, 2014, page 15. 
8 Manes, 2008, page 41. 
9 Manes, 2008, page 43. 
10Jordan, Jenna, 2009, When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation, page 728. 
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she also attempts to find conditions that increase the likelihood a group will collapse after a 
decapitation11 and compares the lifespan of the group after the strike with other groups that have 
not undergone decapitations, and whether this decapitation affected the group’s ability to attack. 
She divides the groups by organization type, age, and size, and found that decapitation strikes are 
not an effective means of reducing violence or destroying groups and is the least effective 
against older, larger, religious, and separatist organizations. As Jordan explained in her later 
work, older organizations become bureaucratized which facilitates the replacement of leadership, 
especially in large organizations12; separatist groups also arise from social movements which are 
often decentralized and enjoy mass public support. Jordan’s findings are significant because she 
addressed not only the lifespan of groups after, but also the effects on their ability to carry out 
attacks which is an important but sometimes overlooked element.  
 Patrick Johnston (2012) attempts to ascertain the efficacy of decapitation strikes by 
analyzing many successful and unsuccessful removals of terrorist leadership13. Johnston only 
focuses on cases where the top leadership was targeted because killings of other individuals 
might lead to misleading results14. All the strikes observed come from asymmetric conflicts, in 
which terrorist groups operate in civilian population, using guerrilla tactics, and from a minimum 
month-long campaign. Johnston found that “neutralizing insurgent leaders has a substantively 
large and statistically significant effect on numerous metrics of counter militancy 
effectiveness”,15 moreover, the fact that Johnston compared failed and successful decapitations is 
                                                            
11 Jordan, Jenna, 2009, page 731. 
12 Jordan, 2014, page 15. 
13 Johnston, Patrick, 2012, Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency 
Campaigns, page 49. 
14 Johnston, Patrick, 2012, page 54. 
15 Johnston, Patrick, 2012, page 77. 
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interesting because many other studies don’t distinguish between failed decapitations and non-
existent decapitations, which can lead to wrong conclusions. By only examining successful 
instances of decapitation, one cannot learn about the instances in which decapitation creates 
undesired effects, Overall Johnston found approximately a 25-30% increase in a government’s 
likelihood to defeat a terrorist organization, which is much higher effectiveness percentage than 
previous studies.  
Stuart Koschade (2006) uses social network analysis to understand how terrorist cells 
communicate and operate, as well as what knowledge can be gained which might help with 
counter-insurgency operations16. This framework is useful for understanding what roles 
individuals play in these organizations and which members are more likely to disrupt the 
operations of the organization17. Koschade then relates this concept to how Jemmah Islamiyah 
(JI) operates, particularly in the context of the 2002 Bali bombings in which the group operated 
cells that coordinated the attacks independently from the organization. Koschade then creates a 
graph connecting each member of the cell, with their specific function and how many other 
members are connected to that one specific member18.  
 He later finds that organizations must balance covertness with efficiency, the more 
connected all the members, efficiency increases but covertness decreases, as communications 
between members become easier to track. This means that the more covert a cell, the more 
effective targeting of an important “node” is, in JI one member was the only point of contact 
                                                            
16 Koschade, Stuart, 2006, A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Applications to Counterterrorism and 
Intelligence, page 559. 
17 Koschade, Stuart, 2006, page 560. 
18 Koschade, Stuart, 2006, page 567. 
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between the two cells, meaning targeting such a member would likely hinder their operations 
greatly19. This article helps make the decision of who is the ideal target in a decapitation 
operation, as the idea of “leadership” can be hard to identify, rather by using a social network 
analysis you can identify the point of contact of specific cells or organizations and target them. 
However, leadership is often more complicated than who oversees coordinating actions of 
multiple members, and this article only covers the tactical operations of individual cells rather 
than groups. Furthermore, in only focusing on the tactical aspect of terrorist organizations, this 
fails to address the ideological importance of leaders in terrorist groups. While killing a tactical 
leader in a terrorist organization might lead to a decrease in the group’s ability to carry out 
attacks, it most likely will not lead to the group’s dissolution.  
 Ethan Bueno de Mesquita (2008) tries to assess the structural factors that can affect a 
group’s likelihood to form factions and subsequently splinter after a major event, like the death 
of a leader. Mesquita finds that as economic conditions improve, groups become less able to 
mobilize and recruit but more extremist, and as a group becomes more extremist, the likelihood 
of a splintering decreases. However, if a splinter does occur, the splinter group will be even more 
extreme than the original, which could increase the ferocity of the attacks and spoil possible 
peace agreements20. 
 Terrorist groups can also increase the cost of splintering, which makes a group more 
extremist when a faction is fighting for control of the group, but otherwise decreases a group’s 
                                                            
19 Koschade, Stuart, 2006, page 571. 
20 de Mesquita, Ethan B, 2008, Terrorist Factions, page 408. 
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extremism21. While not really offering many concrete and applicable answers to determine when 
terrorist groups will splinter, which is very important for counterinsurgency strategies, the paper 
does provide some variables which are worth exploring. Firstly, the idea that factions can affect a 
group’s extremism is interesting, as it might imply that more extreme groups are more vulnerable 
to leadership decapitation because of the lack of factions present. Moreover, the study’s findings 
that an improvement in the economic situation of the populace and a place for non-violent 
grievance resolutions increases extremism means that the presence of such variables could be 
useful when combined with a decapitation strike. 
Seth Jones and Martin Libicki (2008) examined terrorist groups that no longer exist to try 
to draw conclusions on how future groups might also end. The authors claim that most groups 
end when members stop armed struggle and join the political process or when law enforcement 
arrest or kill key members of the organization22. They also use 5 variables to determine which 
one is more likely to help decide the fate of a terrorist group: ideological motivation, economic 
conditions, regime type, size, and goals23.  
 Policing, which is the second-most-common way terrorist groups end, works by 
eliminating the terrorist organization, which includes leadership and logistics through the passing 
of laws and arrests of perpetrators24. Because terrorist groups operate in the civilian population, 
police have a unique ability to gather intelligence and infiltrate these groups, to arrest its 
                                                            
21 de Mesquita, Ethan B, 2008, page 409. 
22 Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki, 2008, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa’ida, page 9. 
23 Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki, 2008, page 15. 
24 Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki, 2008, page 27. 
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members. Their data also shows that the larger a group is, the less likely a group is to end by 
policing or by splintering, but very likely to end because of a turn to politics25.  
 Audrey Kurth Cronin (2006) uses the decline of Al Qaeda, a large and very dangerous 
terrorist group, to draw conclusions on how similar groups might end in the future. She poses 
that terrorist groups generally end because of: the death or capture of the leader, failure to recruit 
the next generation, achieving their goals, transitioning to a political organization, lack of 
popular support, repression, or transition to other types of violence26. I will mostly focus on the 
first of the scenarios that end terrorist groups, the killing or capture of their leader. She claims 
the group’s structure, presence of a viable successor and the existence of a cult of personality all 
affect how effective this tactic is27.  
She then applies each of the likely end-scenarios of terrorist organizations, which I again 
will focus on the killing or capture of leadership of the terrorist organization. She explains that 
Al-Qaeda’s fluid structure, emphasis on independent cells, and lack of cult of personality means 
it can survive decapitation28much easier than other groups. While this article has a limited 
application to decapitation, and mainly focuses on many other reasons terrorist groups end, much 
can still be learned, mainly that a group’s structure, the role of the leader, and the presence of a 
viable successor are a good indicator of the effectiveness of decapitation. However, all the 
examples provided for why decapitation is sometimes effective were of leaders who were 
                                                            
25 Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki, 2008, page 42. 
26 Cronin, Audrey Kurth, 2006, How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups, page 17. 
27 Cronin, Audrey Kurth, 2006, page 18. 
28 Cronin, Audrey Kurth, 2006, page 40. 
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captured and later told their followers to stop the armed insurrection, which is a variable that was 
not mentioned.  
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Hypothesis 
 
Based on the previous literature, my hypothesis suggests that the variables that are most 
likely to determine a group’s future after a decapitation strike are: how extreme the group is, the 
size of the group, and the role of the leader targeted. To reiterate, a decapitation is the intentional 
killing or capture of high-ranking members of an organization, with the intent to disrupt or 
destroy the group because of the lack of leadership. I believe with these variables that the group 
which will be most likely to dissolve and not splinter after a decapitation is a small, extreme 
group, in which the leader targeted serves as the ideological core of the group. Any 
counterterrorism or counterinsurgency strategy is ultimately supposed to lead to a reduction in 
violence, and other studies often consider splintering as a counterinsurgency success. In this 
paper I make the clear distinction between dissolving and splintering because if a group dissolves 
but its fighters carry on the struggle, that ultimately does not lead to a reduction of violence.  
Small groups naturally have less members, and thus possess a reduced ability to replace 
dead leadership. Leaders of small groups also have more contact with a larger percentage of the 
overall members thus increasing their importance. Larger organizations also become 
bureaucratized and develop standardized procedures for their leadership which reduces the 
strategic impact of the loss of leadership, and the time required to acquire new leadership. While 
large groups are less susceptible to dissolve after decapitation, their large numbers increase the 
likelihood factions will form and the group will splinter. As any organization grows, different 
members with different agendas appear, this creates different factions within the organization 
11 
 
that could take advantage of the loss of leadership to create a new, often more extreme group 
after the leader dies. To reiterate, this variable will increase the likelihood of a group splintering 
and reduce the likelihood of the group dissolving after suffering a decapitation. 
 Extreme groups have a reduced ability to recruit new members due to the difficulty for 
average people to connect with the group’s message. This reduces their ability to replace 
leadership and recruit new members when they are killed. The extremism of a group’s ideology 
also reduces the likelihood of factions forming, this is likely because factions are often more 
ideologically extreme than the group they are a part of. This reduction in factions reduces the 
chance of splintering, although if the group does splinter, the new splinter group will rank higher 
on the ideological extremism scale. In summary, as a group’s ideological extremism increases, 
the likelihood the group will dissolve after a decapitation strike increases and the likelihood of 
splinter groups forming decreases. 
And lastly, as previous research shows, eliminating leaders who are responsible for 
carrying out operations often has a tangible effect on reducing a group’s ability to act but often 
does not result in the destruction of the group. However, targeting a leader who is responsible for 
the group’s ideology, or an ideological leader, increases the likelihood of the group dissolving. 
When a tactical non-ideological leader is targeted, terrorist organizations can easily find 
replacements from other senior members or from the targeted leader’s subordinates. Targeting 
the ideological leader of a group often results in the group disbanding if no successor is in place 
due to the morale impact of losing such an important member. Due to the nature of ideological 
leaders, it is also much more difficult to find replacements for these leaders that people will 
12 
 
follow with the same fervor as the previous leader. All the previously mentioned literature has 
proposed that these individual variables can affect a group’s future after a decapitation, but none 
of them have used all the variables I mentioned and applied them to specific groups. To reiterate, 
targeting an ideological leader increases the likelihood of the group dissolving but has an unclear 
effect on the likelihood of a group splintering. 
In this section, I will test my hypothesis by analyzing successful and unsuccessful cases 
of terrorist decapitation, across similar groups with different previously mentioned variables. I 
will categorize each group according to those variables, and how I believe those variables will 
affect the group´s likelihood to either: be destroyed or splinter, after a decapitation. I will be 
using case studies rather than large datasets due to the problems that are inherent in any large 
data set of terrorist groups, such as mis-categorization and broad categories that are unhelpful to 
the question we are trying to answer. For example, large data sets often don’t describe who they 
consider a “leader,” or often make no distinction between a group splintering and disappearing.  
By examining each group individually, we can better understand which variables are 
affecting this specific group, which will help us make predictions on how the decapitation will 
affect them. The groups that I will choose will be affected differently by the previously 
mentioned variables, but will all be subjected to decapitation strikes and their results will be 
compared. The groups that I have chosen are: the Muslim Brotherhood, Sendero Luminoso, and 
the Taliban. I chose these groups because each of them has experienced leadership decapitation 
and they all fall on different ends of the spectrum in relation to size, ideological extremism, and 
the role of the targeted leader.  
13 
 
Decapitations must be viewed like any other counterinsurgency tool, and only be applied 
to certain groups in certain conditions. I believe decapitation strategies are used much more than 
they should be because it allows governments to claim tangible progress against insurgencies is 
being made. However, while decapitations may make for great publicity and help a government 
show its people progress, this strategy often does not lead to a long-term reduction in violence. 
For groups in which decapitations will not be effective, like a large, non-ideologically extreme 
group with a non-ideological leader, other strategies like peace negotiations must be used.  
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Case Studies 
 
The first group I have chosen is Sendero Luminoso (SL) or “the shining path.” SL is a 
communist revolutionary party that has been waging a guerrilla war against the government of 
Peru since the 1980s. The group started in the 1960s in the poor Peruvian state of Ayaccucho, an 
isolated area of the country where the government was largely absent and communication with 
the rest of the country was difficult29. The state had one major university which became both a 
recruitment center for students and attracted many politically motivated individuals, including 
the group’s eventual leader Abimael Guzman Reynoso30. It was in this university that Guzman 
built the Shining path into the insurgency that would sow chaos in Peru, training teachers to 
spread socialist ideas31, and securing weapons and money to wage a socialist revolution against 
the government of Peru32. 
SL was a small group originating in the isolated state of Ayacucho and totaling about 
5,000 fighting members at its peak33 with as little as 350 members remaining active to this day34.  
Being a communist revolutionary party, which calls for armed insurrection against non-
communist nations, SL ranks high on the ideological extremism spectrum. SL’s prominent 
leader, Abimael Guzmán, served not only the operational leader of the group but also as the 
                                                            
29 Art, J, Robert, and Richardson, Louise, 2007, Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, page 197. 
30 Ibid, page 198. 
31 Ibid, page 199. 
32 Ibid, page 200. 
33 Manwaring, Max, G, 1995, Peru’s Sendero Luminoso: The Shining Path Beckons, page 160. 
34 BBC, 2015, Peru admits Shining Path rebels have not been 'exterminated, (accessed February 25th, 2019), paragraph 2. 
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ideological base and he fostered a cult of personality around him,35 as evidenced by his presence 
in the group’s propaganda posters.  
Peru’s government created a specialized police unit to gather intelligence and apprehend 
SL leadership, and this strategy eventually lead to the capture of many of its leaders including 
the ideological leader Abimael Guzamn in 1992. Two years after the capture of Guzman, SL 
ceased being a major threat to the government36 and, while some of its members remain to this 
day37, the group is all but destroyed. Decapitation was very successful against the SL, it took 
only two years for the newly-created specialized police unit to apprehend Guzman, and two 
years after his arrest the group ceased to be a threat to the government of Peru38. 
The next group I will be examining is the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Taliban formed in 
the 1990s from veteran fighters who repelled the Soviets during the Soviet war in Afghanistan, 
the Taliban took advantage of the power vacuum within the country and fought for control over 
the nation with other groups. In 1996 the Taliban took control of the government and established 
a government that reflected its interpretation of Sharia law, which included abuses against 
women and non-Muslims.  The Taliban was ousted from leadership by the U.S. in 2001 during 
the invasion of Afghanistan and have since started an insurgency in the nation and currently 
control parts of the country39. Because of the changing nature of the Taliban, from political 
                                                            
35 Art, J, Robert, and Richardson, Louise, 2007, page 203. 
36 Art, J, Robert, and Richardson, Louise, 2007, page 207. 
37 Ibid, page 216. 
38 Ibid, page 207. 
39 Laub, Zachary, 2014, The Taliban in Afghanistan, page 7.  
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organization to terrorist group, this paper will focus on the Taliban after their ousting by the 
United States in 2001.  
As of 2014, the Taliban is believed to possess around 60,000 members in Afghanistan40, 
which is a medium-to-large number of fighters, but since the Taliban has gained strength in 
recent years, the number of fighters is likely much higher. Being an Islamist fundamentalist 
group, the Taliban ranks high on the ideological extremism scale but not as high as other groups 
operating in the area such as ISIS.  The Taliban has also been subjected to many decapitations 
strikes as well as arrests and killing of many of its members41, but those strikes have been 
unsuccessful in destroying the Taliban and the group has survived over a decade of U.S. 
occupation. The Taliban leadership has been targeted many times, but the leaders targeted are not 
high-ranking ideological leaders but rather operational commanders in charge of day-to-day 
operations. While these strikes influenced the Taliban’s ability to carry out attacks, they have 
been consistently able to replace their leadership and thus those strikes have not been successful 
in dismantling the organization42.  
The last group I will examine is the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt. The Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt is an Islamist political and religious movement with ties to the larger 
international Muslim Brotherhood, and at one point one of the biggest parties in Egypt. Founded 
in 1928, the group quickly grew to over a million followers and 2,000 branches in Egypt alone43,  
                                                            
40 Waldman, Matt, 2014, Strategic Empathy: The Afghanistan intervention shows why the US must empathize with its 
adversaries, page 4. 
41 Wilner, S. Alex, 2010, Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and 
Counterinsurgency, page 308. 
42 Wilner, 2010, page 316. 
43 Zollner, Barbara H, E, 2009, The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan Al-Hudaybi and Ideology, page 11. 
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the group also operated a paramilitary force which trained volunteer in guerrilla warfare44. The 
MB has a history of both being a political party which frequently clashed with contemporary 
governments and financing para-military groups, that history has not changed much with the 
modern MB. The MB continued to clash with the governments of the times, but after the 
overthrow of the Mubarak regime in 201145, the MB entered an agreement with the military 
government of Egypt to co-operatively run the nation46 after the election. 
The MB then ascended to power on June 24th, 2012, under the presidency of Mohamed 
Morsi47. Morsi continued the previous administration’s repressive policies, gave government 
positions to loyal MB members48, and used MB militias to attack the growing opposition to the 
Islamist government. The military eventually ousted Morsi, prompting large protests by the MB 
and allied Islamist organizations, resulting in a clash against government forces that left over 
1,000 people dead49. The government subsequently arrested an estimated 42,000 supporters and 
almost all the MB leadership50, and the group was declared a terrorist organization by the 
government51. After the crackdown, a more extreme side of the MB became visible, calling for 
Egyptians to “rise in revolt” and asking for jihad against the new regime and “martyrdom”52; it is 
very likely the MB splintered after the government crackdowns, as evidenced by the shift in 
rhetoric.  
                                                            
44 Zollner, Barbara H, E, 2009, page 12. 
45 Selim, M, Gamal, 2015, Egypt under SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood: the triangle of counter-revolution, page 180. 
46 Selim, M, Gamal, 2015, page 185. 
47 Ibid, page 189. 
48 Ibid, page 190. 
49 Brown, J, Nathan, and Dunne, Michele, 2015, Unprecedented Pressures, Uncharted Course for Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, 
page 5. 
50 Ibid, page 5. 
51 Ibid, page 6. 
52 Ibid, page 13. 
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Being one of the largest political organization in Egypt, which won an election and 
briefly ruled the nation, the MB ranks high in terms of overall size and is by far the biggest group 
I will be exploring in this paper. The MB, while being an Islamist group, was mainly a political 
organization that advocated for representation in Egypt’s repressive system and thus ranks low 
on the ideological extremism scale. MB, like most political organizations, has very charismatic 
leaders, but these leaders do not serve as the ideological core of the organization. Like most 
political organizations, MB can find replacements for its leadership but not without difficulty. 
Lastly, MB leadership has been routinely arrested in Egypt and that has largely eradicated the 
group, although this has caused splintering within the group that gave rise to more extreme 
elements.  
In conclusion, this paper aims to explore the different variables that affect a group’s 
likelihood to dissolve or splinter after a targeted assassination or arrest of its leadership, also 
known as a “decapitation.” The variables that I will be examining in this paper are: a group’s 
size, their ideological extremism, and the role of the targeted leader; all these variables have a 
direct effect on the group’s future post-decapitation. In this paper I will be using case studies to 
test my hypothesis rather than large datasets, because case studies allow for a broader look into 
the causal mechanisms that lead to each group’s fate after decapitation strategies. The three 
groups that I will be studying in this paper have all been chosen because of their differences in 
size, ideological extremism, and role of leadership targeted; these groups are: the Taliban, 
Sendero Luminoso, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. It is my objective to determine how 
these variables affect terrorist groups post-decapitation, so nations can make informed decision 
about when to remove terrorist leadership. 
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Sendero Luminoso 
 
The history of Sendero Luminoso, hereafter referred to as SL, begins with the creation of 
the Socialist Party of Peru in 192853. The Socialist Party of Peru splintered into over 20 groups 
following international events such as the Sino-Soviet split and Khrushchev’s denouncing of 
Stalin54. One of the biggest splits happened between the Soviet bloc, which supported peaceful 
transition into Socialism, and the Maoist bloc, which supported violent uprising55. A split within 
the Maoist bloc lead to the creation of the Communist Party of Peru – By Way of the Shining 
Path of Mariategui, led by a university professor named Abimael Guzman56.  
The group first spread throughout Guzman’s university, creating student study groups to 
spread their ideology within the university and the urban centers around it57. After this, the group 
began sending activists to the countryside, involving themselves in local town meetings and 
becoming teachers in the local schools58. SL also established cells in other universities, including 
two important universities in Lima and absorbing more radical individuals from other leftist 
organizations active in Peru59.  
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Ideological Extremism 
The ideological extremism of the SL is illustrated by the fact that even in socialist circles, 
this faction of Maoism was deemed too extreme for the already extreme Maoist bloc. Unlike 
other leftist organizations in Peru, which were constantly creating and breaking alliances to win 
general elections, SL saw violent insurrection as the only way to bring socialism to Peru60. 
Another important aspect for determining SL’s extremism are the tactics the group used to 
achieve its goals. SL’s base of support came from the peasantry, and the group wanted to further 
isolate the peasantry from the government, so SL would become the de facto authority in the 
area61. The rural areas in which SL focused its efforts were already largely ignored by the 
government. SL’s main department, Ayacucho, saw little government presence and did not have 
a paved road until late 1970s62.  
SL captured and killed cattle rustlers, cracked down on drunkenness and adultery, and 
assisted with irrigation efforts in the area63. In villages where SL could not infiltrate and involve 
itself inside, the group relied on more direct tactics, like assassinating local village leaders who 
opposed the group’s attempts to establish itself as de-facto rulers64. These villages showed open 
hostility towards SL and the two often clashed, leading to bloodshed and mass migration of 
peasants towards the city-centers65. It is because of all these factors that I rank SL’s ideological 
extremism as very high, and the most extreme group I will be analyzing here. 
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Group size 
The nature of SL, being an insurgency centered around isolated rural communities, makes 
it very difficult to determine the true size of the insurgency at its peak. It is estimated that at its 
peak, SL was only able to field 5,000 fighters66, and thus it is a small group and the smallest 
group I examine in this paper. While SL was able to become dominant in these sparsely-
populated communities, and threaten the Peruvian government, the group did not have 
substantial national support67. Therefore, I consider the SL insurgency to rank low on the size 
scale, specially when compared to the other groups I will be discussing in this paper. 
Role of leader                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Guzman played a central role in the group not only helping its creation but cementing and 
spreading the group’s ideology through his influence in UNSCH68 and creating a strong 
leadership cadre to carry out its war69. Guzman was not only responsible for the tactical 
decisions of the group, such as sending its members into rural communities to gather support for 
SL70, but he was also the ideological center of the group. Guzman’s speeches were spread 
throughout SL, and their tone changed from discussing Marxist theory to a call to violent action, 
with Guzman at the top71. Guzman’s role as the ideological leader of the SL is further illustrated 
in accounts of SL guerrillas yelling “long live chairman Gonzalo (Guzman)72 during battle. 
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The structure of SL is complex, with a national committee headed by Guzman and a 
small number of lieutenants and then 6 regional committees which operate with a degree of 
autonomy73. While all these regional committees operate autonomously, they all followed 
directives set by the national committee. These include instructions regarding group ideology, 
war strategy and policy. SL’s ideology was carefully crafted by Guzman to appeal to the rural 
support base that the group relied on and based its whole identity on. The ideology targeted the 
grievances held by the rural population and pointed to imperialism as the enemy74. Just as 
Guzman was responsible for creating and spreading the group’s ideology, the reliance on him as 
a central figure would eventually lead to the group’s downfall. 
Counterinsurgency efforts 
 Before the Peruvian government began targeting the leadership of the SL, they resorted to 
using tactics such as arresting and executing villagers suspected of being SL members75. 
Members of the Peruvian armed forces would also burn down villages and steal supplies 
suspected of belonging to SL members, as well as cover up any executions the armed forces 
carried out76. The military failed to integrate with the rural population and protect them from the 
SL and would often carry out retaliatory raids against the peasantry following an SL attack77. 
These tactics were not effective at dislodging the SL from these areas, and often caused the 
peasants to view the armed forces and the government negatively.  
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 To further exacerbate matters, the government often deployed police forces that did not 
speak the villager’s language and were of a different race than the majority-indigenous rural 
populations. This added racial tensions to the human rights abuses perpetrated by the 
government, and further drove villagers into the arms of the SL78. Human rights violations by the 
government against civilian populations often increases the popularity of terrorist groups 
operating in the area. Because SL’s Maoist ideology painted its struggle as a fight between the 
repressed rural population and the capitalist urban class, these abuses were even more effective 
at increasing SL’s popularity by painting the group as protectors of the rural class.  
 Many of the villagers that supported the SL were acting out of fear for their lives, SL 
extorted business owners and killed or harmed those that refused79. The military only made 
matters worse, their numerous human rights abuses not only served to further alienate the 
villagers but also drive them closer to the SL. The military crackdowns in 1982 and 1983 lead to 
the creation of the SL’s People’s Guerrilla Army, which SL general Huaman claims helped 
“[protect] the population”80. While knowledge of the atrocities committed by the SL were 
widespread, pressure was mounting against the government to address the human rights abuses 
committed by the military. In 1985, President Garcia fired three generals as a response to human 
rights violations81, violence escalated as the SL saw this as a sign of weakness and struck Lima, 
attacking restaurants and resulting in 18 months of state of emergency 82. 
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Targeted Decapitations  
Between 1988 and 1989, the Peruvian government changed its strategy for defeating the 
SL, adopting a variety of political, social, and psychosocial as well as military strategies83. In 
1990, the government began to focus on wining the support of the local populations by providing 
services, thus painting the military as protectors of the people rather than antagonists84. To solve 
the underlying racial problems, the government stationed soldiers which spoke the villager’s 
language inside the villages themselves to improve cooperation between military and rural 
populations. The government also began to crackdown on abuses and create militias inside the 
villages which could fight SL long enough for the government forces to arrive85. This change in 
government policy was definitely a correct choice and likely had an effect in the group’s 
eventual dissolving.  
After 1992, the Peruvian government adopted a different counterinsurgency, moving 
away from large-scale crackdowns of the civilian population and more towards operations 
targeting the SL leadership86. In May 1992, the government passed the “repentance law” which 
granted amnesty or reduced the sentences of captured SL fighters87, to encourage guerrilla 
fighters to dessert. The army had previously been able to capture some of SL’s top Central 
Committee members, such as Osman Morote in 1988 and Sybila Arrendodo in 1990,88 but the 
capture of these members did not have a significant effect on the insurgency. This may because 
                                                            
83 Art, J, Robert, and Richardson, Louise, 2007, page 204. 
84 Ibid, page 204-205 
85 Ibid, page 205 
86 Taylor, Lewis, 2006, page 169. 
87 Ibid, page 169. 
88 Palmer, David S, 1994, page 201. 
25 
 
these lieutenants did not represent the ideological center of the group but were only in charge of 
the operational side of the insurgency.  
 This new change of strategy also led to the capture of the groups’ ideological leader 
Abimael Guzman in 199289, dealing the biggest blow to the group. Guzman was not only the 
group’s founder and leader, but a personality cult was created around him to promote group 
cohesion, morale and fighting spirit90. After Guzman’s capture, many fighters voluntarily gave 
up and took advantage of the amnesty law, while others began cooperating with the intelligence 
services to further speed up the end of the group91. While some of the provincial committees 
managed to survive the period after the capture of Guzman, they lacked the ability to recruit new 
members outside of their small area and became easy targets for the government to eventually 
eliminate92. 
Sendero Luminoso is often viewed as one of the biggest successes regarding targeted 
removals of terrorist leadership, or decapitation, and with good reason. Scholars consider the 
capture of Guzman to be the pivotal moment in the fight against SL93. By the end of 1994, SL no 
longer posed a serious threat to the government or the people of Peru94. Up to that point, the 
Peruvian government was fighting a losing battle against the SL, their tactics often leading to 
villagers resenting the government and the army. The army eventually moved away from mass 
retaliations against the civilian population and into operations targeted at removing the 
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leadership of the SL. The tide turned against the group when their ideological leader, who was 
responsible for crafting the ideology of the group and spreading it to recruit new fighters, was 
captured in 1992. The importance of Guzman’s captured is illustrated by the many fighters that 
either abandoned the conflict and returned to society or began cooperating with local authorities’ 
shortly after his capture95.  
It is important to note that SL largely did not splinter after the capture of Guzman, while 
small remnants of SL continued to operate96, these still followed the ideology and objectives of 
Guzman. Splintering, when factions inside terrorist groups break off from the main group, is one 
of the possible outcomes that can occur after a decapitation strike, but this did not happen after 
the death of Guzman. As mentioned earlier in this paper, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita (2008) finds 
that as a group’s ideological extremism increases, the likelihood that a splinter faction will arise 
after a decapitation strike decrease97. I propose that this is the reason that a splinter faction of SL 
did not arise after Guzman’s capture, as I previously demonstrated the group’s ideological 
extremism was quite high.  
Sendero Luminoso was a small group, only able to establish itself in rural communities 
and lacking strong national support for their cause. The group was also ideologically extreme, 
demonstrated not only due to their use of terror against civilian populations that refused to 
support them, but also by the fact that even other Marxists and Maoist organizations considered 
them too extreme. The group’s downfall also began after their ideological leader was captured in 
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1992, something that did not happen when other members of the national committee were 
captured. SL is the perfect group to illustrate my hypothesis that small, extreme groups in which 
the targeted leader serves an ideological role are the best targets for decapitation operations. 
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The Taliban 
 
The Taliban is an insurgent group currently waging an insurgency in Afghanistan, and 
with a large presence in nearby Pakistan98. The Taliban’s origins date back to the 1980s during 
the anti-Soviet Jihad when Mullah Omar, a Pashtun tribesman from Ghilzai, first mobilized his 
followers in response to the kidnapping and rape of teenage girls by a local warlord99. The 
Taliban largely belong to an ethnic group known as the “Pashtun,” and derive much of their 
identity and conduct from their ethnic identity100. The Pashtuns living in Pakistan belong to the 
same ethnic group as the ones living in Afghanistan, and consider all Pashtuns as one people, 
separated by artificially created borders101. The group continued to grow and eventually seized 
control of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, in 1996 and established the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan102. 
During their years as the de-facto rulers of Afghanistan, the Taliban enforced their own 
version of Sharia law103 upon the civilian population of Afghanistan, which was previously 
making strides toward gender equality104. The Taliban passed laws forbidding women from 
working, limited a woman’s movement unless accompanied by a male close relative, demanded 
that women wear Burqas in public, and forbid the use of high heels105. Women were also not 
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allowed to use the same medical facilities as men, ride bicycles, or appear on television; the 
Taliban created religious police that would publicly punish people who broke religious law. The 
Taliban also sought to restrict women’s education, forbidding women above the age of 8 from 
attending schools, killing teachers and attacking students on their way to school 106. 
After the September 11th attacks, the United States declared war against the Taliban 
government which was harboring Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda training camps. By December 
of 2001, the Taliban government was defeated, removing its presence from the area almost 
entirely and eradicating its political influence107. After the fall of the Taliban, most fighters hid 
their weapons and returned to their homes, with a lot of commanders fleeing to Pakistan. Local 
warlords aligned with the new U.S.-backed government replaced the Taliban as governors, and 
these groups returned to exploiting the local populace108. Because the new government was 
backed by the U.S., this painted the abuses committed by the warlords as an extension of U.S. 
policy. This abuse of power by forces aligned with the new government and, by extension the 
U.S., increased tensions with the villagers and facilitated the return of the Taliban109.  
Counterinsurgency efforts 
The Taliban in Afghanistan had now evolved into an insurgency, small groups from 
Pakistan infiltrated the country and prepared for an invasion into Afghanistan110. Between 2004 
and 2006, the Taliban tried to stir up local support in the villages it occupied, they first captured 
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villages before moving on to provincial capitals111. The International Security Assistance Forces, 
created and lead by NATO, responded to the Taliban insurgency with indiscriminate use of force 
which led many civilians to flee into the arms of the Taliban112. A popular revolt in Nad-e Ali 
was started by the ISAF forces destroying poppy fields, and the Afghan government stealing 
what little compensation the British offered the farmers113. 
The period between 2005 and 2006 saw an increase by over 400% in the number of 
suicide attacks, a doubling of IED attacks, and a tripling of armed attacks, violence rose an 
additional 27% in 2007114. Taliban forces began deploying in larger numbers as the insurgency 
grew, from company sized units of up to 100 fighters in 2005 to battalion-sized units in 2008, 
showing the group’s growth and ability to move undisturbed115. The Taliban did not focus on 
population centers, but rather occupied villages and recruited supporters from rural areas, 
utilizing ambush and hit-and-run tactics against the Afghan and U.S. security forces116. The 
Taliban also began reducing its numbers of foreign fighters, relying more on local tribespeople 
for its main force, and keeping foreign fighters as IED manufacturers and trainers117. 
The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan at first glance looked like a major victory. In less than 
two months, the Coalition forces were able to topple the Taliban administration and institute an 
interim government. However, as the years went by, the Taliban increased their presence in the 
area and eventually they were able to pose a significant threat to the U.S.-backed regime. The 
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Taliban continues to exist as an insurgency resisting the current Afghani government118 which 
the West continues to support militarily and economically. The Taliban currently contest 66% of 
Afghanistan while fulling controlling 4%, and regularly carries out attacks against the war-weary 
Afghanistan government119.  
Targeted Decapitations 
In 2009, the U.S. strategy against the rapidly growing Taliban insurgency changed, away 
from simple counterinsurgency operations and towards a strategy of targeted killing against 
insurgent leadership120. Eliminating all the Taliban became a very difficult task, so the U.S. 
decided to instead eliminate the Taliban leadership to demoralize the fighters and force them to 
abandon the insurgency121. Because of this clear shift in policy, the period after 2008-2009 will 
be used to analyze the effectiveness of these strikes on the Taliban. 
In 2008, the U.S. killed Mullah Mahmoud, an important Taliban commander and several 
mid-level IED makers, yet this had little effect on the Taliban’s advance122. This is demonstrated 
by their ability to attack Sarposa Prison in Kandahar City shortly after the death of the 
commander, freeing 300 Taliban fighters123. The Taliban lost many of its mid and high-level 
leaders in the period between 2008 and 2009, yet this did not lead to a decrease of cohesion or 
operational ability124. The Taliban were often able to recover from the loss of leader within days 
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of the attack, and the increase in instances of leadership decapitation increased the number of 
attacks carried out by the Taliban125. 
Moreover, these night raids the U.S. used to eliminate Taliban leadership increased local 
support for the Taliban, according to General McChrystal. These killings, rather than incentivize 
the less-motivated fighters to throw down their weapons, might encourage them to adopt more 
violent means126. Insurgent leaders are usually not afraid of death, because they see the struggle 
as being bigger than themselves, and state violence only serves to reinforce this mentality127. 
External pressures, such as leadership decapitations, are also useful in unifying a movement or a 
group, as was the case in 2007 when 13 factions of fighters formed a coalition which became the 
Pakistani Taliban128. 
Local warlords and tribes also used the United States as a mechanism to elevate their own 
status, and to settle old disputes. In 2004, locals accused a tribal leader of working with the 
Taliban, to benefit economically from the tribal leader’s absence129. This led to the United States 
bombing the tribal leader’s house and the leader joining the Taliban, the area which was once 
friendly to the U.S. became a hot zone of insurgent activity130. This situation highlights another 
issue with the U.S. strategy of decapitation, and that is reliance on intelligence which may be 
incorrect, and can lead to increases of violence, rather than a reduction. 
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The U.S. expanded its decapitation efforts between 2010 and 2013, often carrying out 5 
raids a night by July of 2010131. From roughly August 11th to November 11th, Special Operations 
forces averaged 17 missions per night, capturing 368 Taliban leaders and leading to the arrest of 
Mullah Baradar, a co-founder of the Taliban, in Pakistan132. The Taliban experienced no loss of 
cohesion due to these attacks, and their ability to carry out their own strikes did not seem to 
diminish, evidenced by the assassination of Kandahar’s provincial police chief in April 2011133. 
The U.S. strategy of leadership decapitation did not lead to either a short-term reduction in 
operational capability or a mass exodus of less fanatical fights and a destruction of the Taliban.  
Another counter-productive by-product of the strategy of decapitations is the creation of a 
younger and more ideologically extreme Taliban insurgency. The night raids in 2010 and 2010 
reduced the age of the average Taliban leader by 10 years. Whereas before the extremist youth 
represented a minority in the Taliban leadership, which prior to 2011 were balanced by the older 
leaders, these younger members now became the loudest voice in the group. This may explain 
why violence escalated after the removal of leadership, as previously discussed134. Now that I 
have demonstrated how the U.S. strategy of leadership decapitation was not effective, I will 
explore the variables which I believe were most responsible for this failure.  
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Size 
The Taliban insurgency was estimated to have as many as 40,000 core fighters in 2012135 
and 60,000 in 2014, a sharp increase from the 10,000-20,000 fighters it was estimated to have in 
the mid-2000s136. This makes the Taliban a large insurgency, although not the largest one I will 
be examining in this paper, and this is an important variable that will affect the group’s reaction 
to decapitation strikes. According to Jenna Jordan, large groups are less susceptible to 
decapitation strikes due to the redundant positions in the leadership, which spreads command 
across several individuals and allows for those positions to be filled. Her research also shows that 
larger organizations are more likely to rely on local networks for their operation137, which is the 
case with the Taliban138, and these local networks are more resistant to decapitation strikes. I 
believe the Taliban’s large size is one of the reasons that the group was not defeated through 
decapitation strikes.  
Role of leader targeted 
The Taliban’s top leadership structure includes essential military and political guerrillas 
and commanders, and these were the target of the new U.S. strategy of leadership 
decapitation139. These leaders saw the fight in Afghanistan through a lens of radical Islam, 
painting the conflict as a fight between Islam and the infidel West, which now included the 
government in Kabul140. Pashtun leadership is characterized by its dynamic and headless nature, 
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leaders are chosen for their personal charisma and their ability to prove themselves daily141. The 
group’s leader Mullah Omar, while highly charismatic and influential in the group, stopped 
playing a meaningful part in the Taliban since 2006142, possibly due to poor health.  
The Taliban’s leader, Mullah Omar, was not responsible for the group’s ideology and 
behavior like Guzman was for the SL. This is illustrated in his opposition to the use of suicide 
bombing, which was expanded against his orders. Omar’s influence was not enough to stop the 
increasingly-common usage of suicide bombings against civilian populations, even as he 
publicly denounced the practice143. If the Taliban had an ideological leader, and Omar is the 
closest to one the Taliban had, this practice would not have continued.  
 This lack of an ideological leader, who dictates the behavior and dogma of the group, 
might be one of the reasons the U.S.’s multiple decapitation strikes were never able to stop the 
insurgency. Cronin Audrey (2006) argues that targeting leaders who have fostered a cult of 
personality increases the likelihood of successful decapitation144, and the lack of an ideological 
leader in the Taliban makes this strategy ineffective. Most of the efforts focused on the “middle 
management” of the Taliban, which were easily replaced and did not lead to a decrease in 
violence or cohesion within the Taliban145.The Taliban was able to replace the leadership lost 
due to U.S. strikes and grow the size of the insurgency after 2009, the acceleration of the U.S.’s 
policy of decapitation.  
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Extremism 
 The Taliban are an Islamist extremist group and they rank medium-high on the 
extremism scale, while they were religious extremist, they were not as extreme as other groups in 
the area. The Taliban enforced their version of Sharia law when they were in power, abolishing 
non-Islamic festivals, banning all music and dancing, and prohibiting the flying of kites146. They 
also rolled back gender equality efforts in Afghanistan, banning women from working and 
wearing “revealing clothing,” as well as being outside without a close male relative147. 
Compared to other Islamist extremist terrorist groups, like ISIS, the Taliban does not wish to 
establish a global caliphate but rather establish sharia law within Afghanistan and end the 
"foreign occupation" of Afghanistan148.  It is because of these reasons that I have placed the 
Taliban on the medium-to-high scale for ideological extremism, but not as high as a group like 
Sendero Luminoso. 
 Extremism is an important variable because, as it increases, the likelihood that a splinter 
faction of the group will develop decreases149. This may explain why the Taliban did not 
experience the “fissures” and “strife between competing groups” that U.S. military leaders 
expected to see150. Outside group pressures can sometimes even strengthen groups, as evidenced 
by the formation of the Pakistani Taliban151, and this goes against the objective of decapitation. I 
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believe both these group’s higher levels of extremism contributed to the lack of splinter factions 
forming after decapitation strikes.  
There are a couple of variables which are not explored in depth in this paper but that help 
explain why the Taliban insurgency was so resilient to U.S. efforts, and that is the ethnic nature 
of the Taliban insurgency and the help of neighboring Pakistan. The Pakistani political party 
Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam preached about the importance of Sharia and ran networks of Islamic 
schools that regularly trained Taliban leadership and recruits152.  Afghan insurgents also used 
Pakistan as a safe staging grounds for offensive operations, the Taliban benefitted hugely from 
the ethnic ties they shared with Pakistani villagers on the border with Pakistan153. The existence 
of a haven in Pakistan reduced effectiveness of the decapitation strikes because new leaders 
could be recruited and trained in Pakistan, and the fact these new leaders shared ethnic ties with 
the insurgency increased the group’s cohesion.  
The failure of this strategy of decapitation supports my hypothesis that the Taliban’s 
qualities, their large size and lack of ideological leadership, makes the group highly resistant to 
the loss of leadership. Many mid-and-high-level leaders were captured during the period I am 
examining, and this did not seem to have a meaningful impact on the group. The U.S. hoped that 
the death of these leaders would bring fewer extreme fighters to surrender, like we observed after 
the capture of Guzman in Peru. I believe the Taliban’s resilience to decapitation strikes provides 
good evince to support my hypothesis.   
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The Taliban is a perfect case study of what variables decrease a group’s likelihood to be 
severely affected by a decapitation strike. None of the many attempts by the United States to 
destroy the group by targeting its leadership lead to a reduction in its ability to threaten the 
Afghan government long-term. I believe this is due to the lack of an ideological leader in the 
Taliban whose loss would demoralize the group, and the fact that the group is large enough that 
finding replacements is simpler. The Taliban, while being an Islamic fundamentalist group, is 
also not the most extreme insurgency operating in the area, and this has been shown to be a 
factor in reducing the likelihood the group will be severely affected by a decapitation strike. All 
these variables created a group that no only survived multiple decapitations but flourished in 
those subsequent years and is now in control of a large part of Afghanistan.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood  
 
The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamist political organization based in Egypt and 
established in 1928. The group began as a mass-opposition movement and quickly amassed over 
a million followers in Egypt by 1948. At first, the group was concerned with educational reform, 
but later evolved into a religious and political movement that criticized Egypt’s political 
system154. While the M.B. was largely unable to obtain political power, partially due to their 
belief that the government system did not follow the guidelines of Islam, the group’s influence in 
society continued to grow155. The M.B. also operated its own para-military force which was 
created in 1936 to help the Palestinian uprising156 and later used to carry out assassinations 
against government officials in Egypt. In 1948, the government of Egypt designated the M.B. as 
a terrorist organization and ordered the group’s dissolution157. 
 In 1952, a group known as the Free Officers overthrew the government of Egypt, and the 
M.B. voiced their support for the new government. At first the M.B. and the new regime 
cooperated, but their relationship continued to deteriorate as the Brotherhood’s influence grew 
and in 1954 the M.B. was once again targeted by the government until 1971158. Members of the 
M.B. were gradually released from prison and in 1975 a general amnesty for M.B. members was 
issued, freeing the remaining members of the organization159. The M.B. continued to operate 
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with a half-legal status160, and its legality would continue to change throughout the years and 
with each change of government.  
 During the 1980s, the Brotherhood focused on changing Egypt through democratic 
channels, and achieved electoral success by allying with the Wafd party161, but quickly 
abandoned this strategy due to lack of support. In 2005, a constitutional amendment banned non-
approved political parties, and the Brotherhood was once again made an illegal political 
organization162. In March 2006, the Egyptian government again began targeting the Brotherhood, 
and the Brotherhood would retreat from the political sphere only to sporadically organize 
protests163. During this period of oppression, the Brotherhood reverted to its roots of serving the 
people and senior leaders even considered turning the Brotherhood into a charitable 
organization164.  
 In 2011, the Egyptian revolution, which was part of the Arab Spring, toppled the 
government and created hopes of a truly democratic Egypt. These hopes that quickly faded as the 
new Egyptian government persecuted the revolutionaries and worked with the United States to 
serve its interests in the region165. The Egyptian military and the Muslim Brotherhood thus 
hijacked the revolution and took positions of power in the new Egyptian government166. The new 
government put Islamists and Brotherhood members in a council which introduced amendments 
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to the constitution and eventually gave the new parliament the power to draft the new 
constitution.  
With the Brotherhood’s help, the new amendments were approved with 77% of votes, 
and secured Brotherhood control of the next parliament167. During the parliamentary elections, 
the Brotherhood’s candidate Mohamed Morsi secured 52% of the votes and became the 
country’s president,168 shortly after issuing a decree that expanded his powers169. Nationwide 
protests, and the Brotherhood’s use of violence, lead to many deaths and injuries170 until July 3rd 
when the Egyptian military overthrew the Morsi regime began cracking-down on the Muslim 
Brotherhood171. The Muslim Brotherhood is different from the other groups I discuss in this 
paper because, while it has a history of supporting militias, it is mainly a political organization. 
Decapitation strikes against political organizations may not have the same effects as they do 
against insurgent groups, and may actually drive people to further violence.  
Targeted decapitations 
As previously mentioned, decapitations can either take the form of killings or arrests of a 
group’s leadership, and the new military government carried out a policy of mass-incarcerations 
against the Brotherhood. Due to the Brotherhood long history with government crackdowns, I 
will focus on the period after the ousting of Morsi in 2013. In late 2014, the number of people in 
jail exceeded 42,000 and included almost all the Brotherhood’s leadership, as well as thousands 
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of its local supporters172. The Brotherhood was declared a terrorist organization and the 
government tied the Brotherhood to Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis which is currently carrying out an 
insurgency against the Egyptian government173. In June 30th, 2015, President Abdel Fattah el-
Sisi pledged that death penalties for Brotherhood leaders would be enforced, and a few days later 
nine alleged Brotherhood members were killed during a government raid174.  
While the Egyptian government utilized a strategy of decapitation against the 
Brotherhood, as evidenced by the arrest of almost all the Brotherhood’s leaders, the government 
also used mass-incarceration against Brotherhood supporters175. This goes against the general 
philosophy of decapitations, in which only the leaders are targeted, in the hopes the less-
committed members will abandon the cause176. This is an important variable when examining the 
Egyptian government’s actions because they may explain the success, or lack thereof, of this 
strategy. The Egyptian government’s policy of mass-incarceration may result in more people 
becoming radicalized and take up arms, as I will demonstrate below.  
 However, this crackdown by the government did not lead to the dissolving of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, as the group has a long history of being targeted. Rather, the older members who 
lived in exile called for peaceful protests the Al-Sisi regime, calling for a return to the societal 
outreach that made the Brotherhood strong in past decades177. However, the younger members 
blamed the older ones and called for a violent approach, creating small insurgent organizations 
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such as the Molotov Movement and the Revolutionary Punishment178. The Brotherhood held 
new elections, and by 2015 90% of the new members were part of this younger generation that 
called for “jihad” against the regime179.  
 There are a lot of similarities between the Taliban and the Brotherhood, which instead of 
disappearing after losing its leaders, they were merely replaced with younger and more extreme 
leaders. Moreover, the death of the older, and less extreme leaders led to an increase in violence 
and extremism and generated anger towards the government180181. Revolutionary Punishment 
was responsible for 150 attacks on Egyptian police in its first year182, which was supported by 
part of the Brotherhood’s leadership. A book distributed online by a faction of the Brotherhood 
called for open and violent “popular resistance” against the Egyptian regime183, further showing 
the increasing extremism and the rise of splinter groups inside the Brotherhood.  
The Muslim Brotherhood has a long history of being targeted by the Egyptian 
government, the group’s influence increases and decreases with each new administration. But 
just like all the previous times the Brotherhood was targeted, the group was not destroyed but 
rather went into hiding and changed. It is also important to note that both during the 1948 
crackdown184 and the most recent crackdown, splinter factions of the group appeared185, which 
made the group more extreme and dangerous.  
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Size 
Statistics on the number of Muslim Brotherhood members in Egypt at the time of the 
government crackdown in 2013 are hard to find, but Mohamed Morsi received 5.7 million votes 
in the first round of elections186. We cannot assume that all those voting for Morsi were 
Brotherhood members, but even if only a fifth of those voting were in fact Brotherhood members 
that still make the Brotherhood a very large organization. Currently, it is estimated there are 
900,000 voting Brotherhood members in Egypt187. The group’s size is an important variable on 
both why the group was not destroyed during this crackdown, which is the most severe in the 
group’s history188.  
Ideological extremism 
The Muslim Brotherhood was careful to not offer a detailed view of their vision for an 
Egypt ruled by Islamic values189, because of this I focus on the group’s actions to determine their 
ideological extremism. During its early years, the Brotherhood used the concept of Jihad to 
justify its opposition to Western influence and Zionism, creating specialized paramilitary units to 
fight in Palestine and assassinate political rivals190. However, after the Brotherhood was once 
again legalized, its ideological extremism had to be reduced to appeal to young voters191. As 
evidence of the Brotherhood’s adoption of more mainstream ideas, Morsi’s presidential platform 
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mentioned Islam and Sharia 14 and eight times respectively while topics like the economy and 
development were mentioned 158 and 178 times respectively. 
Because of this, I rank the Brotherhood’s ideological extremism between the 2011 
election and Morsi’s ousting in 2013 as low-to-medium, and I think this is one of the reasons 
why the group experienced splintering after 2013. In Ethan de Mesquita’s (2008) paper, he 
shows that as groups become more extreme, the likelihood that the group will splinter 
decreases192, this is because the more extreme a group is, the more capable it is to placate its 
more extreme factions. Whereas the Brotherhood’s insistence on peaceful resistance lead to 
many splinter factions becoming disillusioned with the Brotherhood and taking actions on their 
own. After the government’s crackdown of the Brotherhood a lot of splinter groups formed193 
and as of 2016 two different factions inside the Brotherhood claim legitimacy194.  
Role of leadership 
The Muslim Brotherhood is mainly a political organization, and the leaders of the group 
must be charismatic enough to be elected into those positions. Brotherhood leaders have a 
following, and many are considered the spiritual leaders of the group, like Yusuf Qaradawi who 
drew a huge crowd in 2011 after returning from exile195. Although no longer a member of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, his influence is nonetheless important within the group, and his extremist 
views196 appeal to the more extreme factions of the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood’s leaders 
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serve both an operational and spiritual role in the organization, and like many political groups, 
serve as the face of the movement and are thus susceptible to decapitation.  
 However, the Brotherhood does not derive its ideology from its political leaders, but 
rather from its general principles and the teaching of founding Brotherhood members, like 
Hassan al-Banna197. This is in sharp contrast to a group like SL, where the group’s ideology 
stemmed from the sermons of their leader198, and the capture of their leader signified the end of 
the group’s ideology. The group’s general principles are also vague, thus allowing it to derive its 
ideology from multiple sources and individuals, ensuring no single member is the ideological 
core of the Brotherhood199.  
Just like the Taliban, there are several unexplored variables that might explain why the 
Brotherhood did not dissolve, but rather splinter, after the most severe wave of repression in 50 
years200. I think one of the main reasons for the group’s survival is its immense size and 
international connections, which allowed its members in exile to continue. A Brotherhood branch 
was open in Istanbul after the latest crackdowns, and this group is headed by Brotherhood 
leadership that managed to escape before arrest201. The Brotherhood also underwent an 
ideological evolution after the government crackdowns, away from a policy of non-violence and 
espousing open violence against the Egyptian regime202. This was done because of the presence 
of radical Islamist terrorist organizations in Egypt which seek to recruit disillusioned 
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Brotherhood members203. Had the Brotherhood not evolved in this way, it might have lost its 
young members and been dissolved in Egypt.   
Another important variable is the fact that the Brotherhood is not an insurgent group like 
the last two groups I examined. The Brotherhood used paramilitary groups to both accomplish 
overseas goals, like helping the Palestinian uprising204, and to stop opposition demonstrations, 
but at their core they are still a political organization. People join insurgencies because the 
political avenues that are used to resolve grievances are ineffective or inaccessible205, and 
targeting a political organization may very well drive people to insurgency. Decapitation 
strategies are meant to be used against insurgent groups, not political organizations, and this may 
explain why this strategy did not lead to a reduction of violence or an end to the Brotherhood.  
 Decapitation against the Brotherhood has led to mixed results, the group went from being 
one of Egypt’s largest political organization and controlling the government to now being 
reduced to small remnants and splinter groups206. However, the emergence of splinter groups and 
the increasing extremism of the remnants of the Brotherhood have led to increased levels of 
violence and instability in Egypt207. However, the group’s massive size and medium extremism 
have allowed it to survive so far, although many splinter factions of the group have arisen 
because of the government’s crackdown. As the government extends their decapitation efforts, 
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and targets the younger and more extreme leaders, it is likely the group will cease to exist, 
although its international reach will make that very difficult.  
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Conclusions 
 
These three cases confirm my hypothesis that: group size, ideological extremism, and the 
role of the targeted leader all majorly contribute to the effectiveness of leadership decapitation. I 
chose all these cases due to their different characteristics and contexts and examined why 
leadership decapitation did not have the same effect on all these groups. The biggest difference 
in these groups has been the effectiveness of leadership decapitation, ranging from total 
eradication of the group like in SL to no decrease in cohesion or capability like in the Taliban. 
Because leadership decapitation is a very important tool in the fight against insurgent groups, it 
is important to examine when this tool is most effective.  
While all these variables play an important role in the effectiveness of leadership 
decapitations, the most significant variable appears to be the role of the leader targeted. Groups 
that derive their ideology from the leader, such as SL, are especially susceptible to leadership 
decapitation. This may be because the capture or killing of their leader signifies the defeat of 
their ideology, or because without the leader’s guidance the remaining members do not know 
how to continue the struggle. In the case of SL, Guzman created the group’s ideology through his 
speeches, and it was the leader’s interpretation of Maoist ideology that formed the core of the 
movement, and once Guzman was gone the group’s ideological core ceased to exist.  
It is precisely this reason why I believe the Taliban was able to survive the repeated 
decapitations by the U.S. in the period after 2008. The Taliban did not derive its ideology from 
Mohammed Omar, but rather from the group’s interpretation of the Quran and their Pashtun 
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codes. Omar’s repeated attempts to stop the younger and more extreme Taliban leaders from 
engaging in suicide bombings demonstrates that he did not have the same role as Guzman, whose 
commandments would never be ignored in SL. The Taliban was able to replace its dead 
leadership without much effort, unlike SL which was unable to survive without its ideological 
leader and its ideological core.  
Ideological extremism plays an important role in the group’s likelihood to splinter after a 
decapitation, splinter groups are often more dangerous and extreme than the group they 
splintered from. This is quite evident in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, which after 
repeated arrests of its leaders and members, the group splintered into many more extreme 
factions which carry out violent attacks in Egypt. The Taliban, on the other hand, was able to 
remain cohesive after repeated decapitations, and avoid the splintering that the Brotherhood 
underwent. This is because the Brotherhood was not an ideologically extreme group in 2011 and 
was not able to cater to its more extreme members who became disillusioned by the Brotherhood 
after repeated decapitations and mass-incarcerations.  
Lastly, groups size is a very important variable, because it allows groups to very quickly 
replace lost leaders and members. The Brotherhood, the largest group I examined, still had 
900,000 members after all the repeated attempts to eradicate the group. The Brotherhood’s size 
also meant they had an international presence which would further complicate the eradication of 
the group. The Taliban was also a large insurgency, and it was also able to replace its lost 
members and leaders very quickly and escalate its attacks after decapitations.  
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Recommendations  
 
 Now that I have shown why these variables are important when carrying out decapitation 
strikes, it is important to make policy recommendations to avoid unintended consequences of 
decapitation strikes. As clearly demonstrated, decapitation strikes can have wildly different 
effects on groups depending on how they are affected by the variables. Before carrying out a 
policy of decapitation, nations need to utilize their intelligence apparatus to attempt to 
understand the groups they wish to decapitate. This process will take time, but it will avoid 
counterproductive results, like escalations of violence, which may result from targeting the 
wrong groups.  
 Decapitations are one tool of many in the arsenal of counterinsurgency, and like any 
tools, it must only be used in specific circumstances. Gathering this information may take time, 
but the results from targeting a group that is not susceptible to decapitation strikes will likely 
make the situation worse. It is also important not to target just any leader, like the U.S. did in 
Afghanistan, but make sure the leaders that are targeted will cause the downfall of the group. If 
the recommendations laid out in this paper are followed, I believe this will lead to much more 
successful decapitation strikes.  
 If decapitations are not useful in those scenarios, the question remains on how to deal 
with large, non-ideologically extreme groups that do not have ideological leaders. Luckily, those 
groups are the easiest to deal with politically. If a group has large public support, as reflected by 
its large size, it is very likely they have a valid political criticism and addressing that criticism 
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might lead to a reduction in violence. Political solutions to insurgencies are often not very 
popular, since the population might feel anger towards these groups, but if the ultimate goal is a 
reduction of violence, these solutions should at least be considered.  
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